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I.  THE  cor.l1.1ITMl~JT TO  1'"EGOTIA TE 
1.  Followini~ the first part  of the United  N~tions Negotiating Conference  on 
the  Common  FW,d  (7th  ~~rch- 3rd April,  1977)  and the  Community's  decision in 
Rome  on 25th i\'farch,  1977  that  "there should be  commodity price stabilisation 
agreements  wh'~re appropriate  and that there should be  a  Common  Fund",  all 
participants :ln the  Conferen~e on International Economic  Co-operation  (CIEC) 
agreed: 
"that  a  •Common  Fund should be  established as  a  new  entity to serve as 
a  key  inl3trument  in attaining the agreed objectives  of the  Integrated 
Programm·~ for  Commodities  as  embodied in UNCTAD  Resolution 93(IV). 
They als•o agreed that its specific purposes  and objectives,  as \vell as 
its othe:t·  constituent  elements,  will continue to be  negotiated in the 
United N::3.t.ions  Conference  on Trade and Development  (UNCTAD).  [:'md  thei] 
pledged 'themselves to secure a  successful conclusion at the forthcoming 
resumed 
1t3ession  of the  United Nations Neogtiating Conference  on  a 
Common  Fimd scheduled for November  1977  at plenipotentiary levclo" 
The  Community will thus  enter the  second round of the  negotiatior,r~,  to  be 
held in  Genevr~ between 7th November  and 2nd  December,  on  the basb  of a 
clear  politid~l commitment  which must  now  be  defined in a  form  capable  of 
detailed pres·entation and defence. 
2o  The  pu.t'p·ose  of the  present  communication is to hono·ur this political 
commitment  by trtmslating it into a  concrete proposal  for- a  Common  Fund. 
Drawing on  work  i~onducted hitherto both within the  Commu:nity  and between the 
Community  and  i t1~  industrialised country partners,  the  p'r-oposal is based  on 
the  establis~ment of a  Common  Fund in the  form  of a  pooling of the resources 
made  available  w:l thin individual buffer s·tock agreements,  on the  underGt::l.:-:ding 
that a  sufficient number  of such agreements  can be  induced to partioip:tte. II.  ELEi:::~:!11'"TS  FOR  A  CON;v.T~ITY POSITION 
Six main  problem areas require attention 
and  decision in order to  determine  the  contents of a  Community  position for 
the  reconvened Negotiating Conference,  namely: 
whether or not  the  Common  Fund's activities should be  related 
exclusively to the  financing of buffer stocks  or should have  a  role 
in the  financing of measures  other than buffer stocks; 
whether or not  special arrangements  may  be  conceived to facilitate 
the  participation of poorer producing developing countries  in 
commodity agreements; 
the  functioning and  feasibility of a  Common  Fund as  a  pooling mechanism 
between buffer stock agreements; 
whether or not. an  element  o.f  own  resources  or a  guarantee facility 
should  be  provided  for the  Common  Fund  and the  form  that this should 
take; 
the  management  and  decision-making arrangements  for a  Common  Fund; 
whether  or not  a  provisional  framework  aerocment  might  be  required prior 
•  to the  entry into  force  of sufficient buffer stock agreements  and the 
conditions  under which  this would  enter into operation. 
These  issues are  outlined seriatim together with proposals in each  case.  It 
is recalled that  in many  detailed issues not  covered here,  but  which  may  take 
on  importance  as  the negotiation  evolves,  sufficient ourgin must  be  left to 
the  Community's  negotiators.  The  Commission  may  also \ol'ish  to return in due 
course to the ·Counci 1  with appropriate supplementary  pr•oposa.ls  concerning 
the  Community's  negotiating position as  and when  the  circumstances  of the 
negotiation require. 
III.  !·3ASURES  OTHER  THAN  BUFFF.R  STOCKS 
The  Col'llr.lission  recalls that  both  developing and  ir!dustrialised countries 
during the first  part  of the Negotiating  Conference have  agreed that the  ~~in 
function  of any  Common  Fund  should relate to the  financing of buffer stocks. - 4 -
The  provisional position paper  submitted by Group  B during the March 
Negotiating Conference  stated: 
"Whilst  fully recognizing the  importance of mE:asures  other than 
buffer stocking,  the need and  scope  for a  Common  Fund  in this 
context  should be  further  explored having due  regard to the 
international machinery which currently support  such measureso 
If other measures are to be  financed through  a.  Common  Fund,  the 
account  for  such  fin~~cing should be kept  sep~rate from  that  of 
buffer-stock financing." 
It must  be  noted,  however,  that preparatory talks and negotiations  so  far  on 
the 18 products covered by the  UNCTAD  Integrated ProgTamme  for  Commodities 
indicate that  only  some  of these  commodities  may  be  e~bject to the conclusion 
of commodity agreements based  on buffer stockso  For  certain developing 
commodity producing countries a  role for the  Common  J~d in the financing of 
other measures  than buffer stocks is of major  importance  a.nd  the developing 
countries as a  group  cannot  envisage a  successful  coaclusion to the  Negotiating 
Conference without  themo  The  Commission  remains,  however,  of the opinion that 
most  of the measures  so  far  envisaged,  e.g  ..  in the  IntegTated Programme(l), 
· co  .~d and  should be  financed  by the established  exi~;ting international agencies 
(e.g.  International Bank  for Reconstruction  ~d  Development  (IBRD),  United 
Nations  Development  Programme  (UNnP),  Interna·tiona.l  Fund for Agricultural 
Development  (IFAD),  or regional banks),  These  agencies are already actively 
engaged in promoting commodity  exportsv  production,  and transformation in 
the context  of overall  economic  development..  It it=:  hard to see what  advantage 
to  international  cooperation may  be  obtained from  i;he  establishment  of a  new, 
inexperienced,  and relatively small  agency with no  direct market  involvement, 
whose  decision-making procedures would  scarcely be  compatible  \,!i th those of a 
development  agE-mcyo  A  pooling mechanism  operating· essentially with revolving 
(1)  rf};8S(_;-;~nge  from  promotional  activities,  research  and  devel0pr:1ent  for 
improved  prodl.!.ct  quo.lity and ·u.se,  to product  procesGing,  to ii  versifi-
cation out  of produntion 1  and to provision  of infrastructure fostering 
trade,  prod.uction or productivityQ f'und.s  for buffer  stocks would not  lend itself to the concessional 
and  non-reco~·erable fina:n ~ing which  "other measures" would appear  essentially 
f  ' 
to involvef  a.nd  any  financing for other measures  would require a  second 
separate mec:banisrn. 
IV.  POORER  DEVELOPING  PRODUCDTG  COUNTRIES 
A  Common  Fund based  on a pooling system for buffer stock  fir~ncinb would 
help the  special position of poorer  producing developing countri(·  ··  only insofar 
as it achieved overall financial  economies  on the  financing of  s~o:~!-:3  of 
interest to 'them.  Discussions  on  certain individual  corn:modi ties  rtCJ.Ve  sho•..m 
that  such countries may  be  disinclined to enter into stocking  arr~-.r:;e:ements 
without an  element  of additional help.  Such help might  be  provided  by the 
International Nonetary Fund's  (HIF)  Buffer Stocking Faci li  ty7  althoue;h 
.,_ 
l.vS 
interest  ratt!ls  are not  concessional.  The  Commiaoion  propoaeo  th·.1.t  ti:c 
Community  ~lh<:iuld  indicate its readiness in due  course to  ex:.o.mine  v.Jlmt  eleo.;ent s 
of subsidy t  c•  INF interest rates might  be  required,  and  -vrhether  the  Commpn 
- -
Fund  may play any role, in this f:rramework. 
V.  THE  POOL DIG  SYSTEM 
1.  On  the 'tlasis  of  Commission proposals the  Council  irt  l!;o.rch  defined the 
Community's  (lpening  F'osi tion in the Negotiating Conferetlce in terms  of a 
pooling  synt~fm 1  i.e. an arrangement whereby  commodity  bnffcr stock a(;recr:Jents 
agree to  dep<:1si t  a  proportion of their financial  renources with  a  central 
pool in retuzn for guaranteed drawing rights  on that  pool.  This  appro~ch 
in turn became  the  core  of the position put  forward in the Negotiating Conference  by 'jhe  Group  B industrialised. countries. ·  ElCPel:-t  discussions 
before,  during and since ·the  March  opening session of the Negotiating 
Conference: have  exposed a  numb~r of technical variations as to how  sucil  a. 
pool  could  fun,~tion without  any clear choice being  adopte1~.  The  purpose 
of this  Commun:tca.tion is to· propose formally the  outline of such  a  pool. 
· 2.  Any  form  of poolingmechanism is based on  a.  combina.t:~on of agreed 
·ctcpor::it  obliga1;ions  on the  one  hand and of maximum  dra·,rint~ rights  on the 
o·d1er.  The  p-roblem is 1;o  deterriline the  optimum  levels  of these two  elements 
<'tnd  their rela-.,ionship to  each  other and this from  the  po:lnts  of view of the 
. optimal :functioning of the pool  t  the .  atta.i_nment  of a  m:lxiroum  degree  of 
fir,ancial "aa:oi.,rJgo"  to be  obtained compared with the situation in which 
inch  vidual buf:fer stock agreements are  fir1anc~d in isolat;fon,  a.nd  the 
provision of sufficient attraction to induce buffer stock agreements to 
aseociate with the pool. 
D  "t  1 1"  t".  eno:n  o,~ lG"a ·1ons.  A  number  of ideas  have  been  pui;  forward: 
- depoSit  of all financial· resources  made  to individ11al  agreements; 
deposit,  for the first buffez: stock purchases,  of  iL  bri ven  percentage 
of the  resources  made  avai  l~ble to· indi  vidu.:1.1'  a.gre•;rnents; 
a  system requiring individual agreements to  financ(~ a  first 
per~entagc of their'buffer stock  purchas~s, with  recource to the 
·.Co~~on Fund for their later purchases in ·periods of greater economic 
eli ffi  cul  ty. 
The  final :::;cheme  -will  very much  depend  on  furthor  ciiscussions and negotiation3. 
But  on  the oasis  of fact  oro  set  out  below there  scor:JG  to  ])e  merit  in a  mecii::111 
course,  vlhere1Jy  participating buffer stock agreements  deppsi  t  a.  certain 
proportion only of ·their funds: -7-
Examination of the  commodities that  might  come  v.;ithin a  pooling 
Gystem in tr  e  foreseenble  future  suggests that  if' the  pa.rtici.p3.tir,g 
corr~odity agreements  were to deposit  around half of their  f~~ds, 
the  Common  l<"Und  should have  sufficient liquidity to meet  its 
obligations  and  to achieve overall  finc:tncial  "savings" by  me.:u;.s  of 
•the  compensation  effectedo 
A.  requirement  for individual  conunodity  2..;-rcementG.  to deposit  more 
tha.:rt  half of their resources  in the · Cor.ur.on  Fund '11'0uld  probably 
discourage  them  from  joining in the first  place.  In any  case  the 
deposit  obligation must·be  in line with the  fin~Lcial 
requirement  for an average  stockholding level. 
It  would  be  eacier to move  towards  highEJ:::- deposi-t  le·.rels  in the 
l:i.c;ht  of  ~xperience than to evolve in the opposite clirecti ono 
/ 
T'he  levol  of·  overall  "savincs" whic}"l  could be  expected.  fr·om  thEl  operation 
of a  system  of this kind  vzill  only 
become  apparent  in the  light  of experience.  But  on  the  t:a.sis  of various 
m<,rlols  conct:rning the  participation of indivlclua.l  COffililO<'..ities  and the 
movements  of W<J.rkets,  they may  currently be  a.sml.Illc:d' to  ·b~  of the region of 
15/20)'~ of the total othe:n.;ise  required for separato  buff~r stock fin.ancir:g. 
DraHim~ riP."hts.  The  maximum  drawing ri"""'t  \'rould  be  ealcu1ated as  the  _  _......_,__  &· 
s-x-.1  of the deposit  obligation plus  a  given  percenta.ce  ~  rl'h.is  percentage 
would  be  in line with the  expected proportion of  "cav:i.nt;8 11  to be  achieved 
',:;,:r  the  poolo  Study hitherto  sugeestn that this will be  in the reeion  of 
·J  ·~~-20}~ and that it may  provide a  sufficient margin  of incentive to buffer 
stock agreemer:.ts  t'o assc;ciate with the pool.· 5.  The  arrangements negotiated will need to be  encompa13sed in a  set 
of clear rules,  capable  of as automatic an application a••  possible  on a 
strictly non-discriminatory basis  between  individual  co~JOO(lity agreements. 
These w-ill  provide the terms  on which bilateral  a.o<Teemen~~s  can be  signed 
between these individual  commodity agreements  and the  Common  Fundo  It should 
be  a  major task of the Negotiating Conference to reach ajp-eement  on these 
rules,  having particular reference to the following  ,poin·~s: 
Applit~l.tion/wi  thdrawal:  each individual  comrnod.i  ~y agreement will be 
free  ·~o  decide whether or not to  join in the  Common  Fund  systemo  If 
they .join they must  accept  the full obligations  :~nvolved.  If they 
decid•~ to withdraw they should only do  so after  ~~ue  noticeo  It would 
be desirable to establish the general rule that  pe"'il  commodity agree-
ments  do associate with the  Common  Fund and that they  (a) renain 
rrithin the Fund for a  minimum  of two years,  (b)  tnake their neces::oary 
depos:L t  at the moment  of joining and  (c)  agree  tt:>  repay their :i.oans 
in fu:Ll  at the moment  of withdrawal,  after due  nt:>tice.  The  Common 
Fund should itself have  the right,  by· duly consi,iered majority 
decision,  to ask for  a:n:y  individual commodity agreement to withdraw 
from  ~he system,  if it believed that its credit ;facilities were 
being abusedo 
Interest rate policy:  expert  examination so far  indicates that 
provision for the  ,Payment  of  inte~est on  both  deposits  and  on 
drawi·ngs  would  be  more  likely to guarantee  the attractiveness 
of the pocl to individual agreements  and thereby its viabilityo 
Interest rates for both deposits and overdraft  drawings  should be -9-
closely ralate(- to going rna.rket  rates.  ifna.tever  rates are applied, 
the rates  cha1·ged  on  drawings  should be  marginall;r higher than those 
charged on deposits:  the differential might  be  uped to cover 
administrative costs. 
VI.  PROVISION  OF  ADDITIONAL  GUAHANTEE 
L  T"ne  pool  may,  however,  at times  be  in  danger  of being exhausted and for 
the following reasons  not  be  able  by itself to give  a  loo;~ guarantee that the 
credit necessary t? meet  all its maximum  drawing right obligations would be 
available all the  time. 
Comrnodi ty markets  might  move  dovmwards  at  the  same  time  and  lead to 
such a  demand  for  credit for financing stocking o:pera.tions  tb.at  the 
pool would  become  e~1austed. 
Implementation of price or tonnage  review 
clauses within commodity agreements  might  pose  aojpe  short-term strain 
on  the resources availableo 
There mey  be  need for ancillary resources  during  the initial period 
of  sto,~k building,  particularly in connection wit:p  commodity agree-
ments  financing stocks out  of levies  on trade. 
;:,orne  form  of  gll1l.rantee  (or back-up)  facility vlillw  theref,;:~re 1  be  required to 
eru'1.ble  maximum  cirawing rights to be  gua.ranteed absolutely and to  en.o.ble  the 
Common  Fund to a.ct  as  a  source of supportive  loan finance  in connection with 
initial Gtock ·ouilding operations and/or stock building r,equired as  a  result 
of either price or tonnage  review,  foreseen within commodity agreements.  The 
Corr~ission pro}oses that its maximum  size might  be  stated as the  difference 
(currently ass·t.tmed  to be  15-20/~) between deposit  obligati,;mo  and maximum 
drawing rights-.--10.. 
2.  i•lethods  of  ~•rn.ntee orovision.  Various ways  of pi'oviding such a 
guarantee  may  be  envisaged,  namely: 
by existing international financial  institution~; 
by direct  government  contributions; 
by means  of loans raised on the capital market  'ITi th, aui  table 
collateral. 
2.1  Internatior..al  financial  institutions.  Existing interr..ational orga.ni-
sations  suQh as  the  IBRD  and  IMF,  it has  been suggested,  might  provide the 
g-uarantee to the  Common  Fund.  However there are  certt:~,in difficulties 
that would limit the Bank's  efficacity: 
its tern1s  of reference focus  very much  on  developmE;~t rather than  on 
stabiliaation of trade; 
there are  several interested commodity trading countries which are not 
members  of the  Bank and it will be  essential to inv·olve  them,  particularly 
those uhich are  prominent  in commodity trade; 
complica,ted  changes  of articles might  be  required,  with in a.rJY 
event  dE
1oisions requiring submission to the Bank's Board. 
2.2  Direct  contributions.  It has  been suggested that  par~.icipating 
governments,  should endow  the  Common  Fund with  a  direci,ly contributed. 
element  of own  resources.  This  has  met  with  consider(l,ble resistance 
from the ma,jori ty of industrialised countries.  An  an(i,lagous  suggestion 
that  individual governments  might  make  voluntary cont:r:•ibutions  suf'fer 
from  the  drawback that  such an approach would not  provide the certain 
source  crf  ~upplementary financial support  required, 
2.3  Loan  finance  could be  provided from  the capital markeifo  Such  borrowing 
operatiomJ  would require sufficient collateraL  This  collateral could 
b·::.  provided by: 
liens  on buffer s·tocks  ~ 
provision of sulJscri  bed  or callable capital from  P¥'tioipating 
governmentse -11-
Examination  has  shown that  liens  on buffer stocks would not  on their owp  - provide  sufficien·'·.  collateral for the  borrowing requirements.  As  for  1 
capital provision by  governments  no  case has hitherto  been  made 
indicating any advantage to be  obtained from  the provision of subscribed 
paid-up capital  compared with callable capital which  could provide  ~uch 
of if not  the totality of the collateral requirements  for borrowing 
operations. 
3.  The  basis  for  financing.  The  Commission  proposes  that  a  combination of 
the above  elements  should be  employed in order to constitut.a  the guarantee 
facility.  The  possibility of some  fina..'1.ce  being provided ·o;r  existing 
intern.~.tional financial  institutions and by direct  govornmc;:1t  contributions 
shoul·!  ;ontinue to be  explored~  An  additional  borrm-1ing requirement  must, 
howc•,r,;:·,  be  expected.  Collateral for part  of this borrowin$ will  be  provided 
by  liens  on  stocks.  A residual  element  of collateral appea:rs  likely to be 
required.  The  Commission,  therefore~  proposes  t~~t all &ov~rnmonto partici-
pating in tho Fund(l),  with the exception of com1tries with a  GlW  per  capita 
below  ;(~oo,  should participate  (on  a.  GNP  basis) in providin1;;  ca.pi tal on  C<l.ll 
u~)  to the overall maximum  requi  redv  less  such  sums  which  cn.n  in time reliably 
be  a:1sured  by international organisations,  from  volunt.:1.ry  e~:>vernmcnto 
contributions,  or  from  loans raised through  iiens  on stocks, 
1.  The  Commission  oees  two  major realiotio choiceo  concernine mombcrchin. 
Nernbarohip  both  of commodity  councils and  of individunl oountrias, 
with  a  careful balance  of voting between the two; 
ro8erving membership to individua.1  cou.ntrico,  leaving individu..1.l 
commodity  councils  as  observers,  on  tho  basis  tha.t  l'Ol.J.tiono  between 
individual  counci lo  and the  Fund  are  to be  tho  oubj«,ct  of cloar and 
autCJmatic  ru1en  covorning the Fund 9s  opcrationoo 
t1)  I  ,  ncludinc;  cc1.:.ntriec  which,  whilst  possibly not  r.1embers  of in<iividua.l  con:::-:10di  ty 
agreementsn  are in substantial financial ·surnlns~ -12-
The  Commission  proposes the second al-ternative.  It sees  th~ Fund as  a 
fini.U"'.cial  mechanism and believes that  ·~he  more it can  opera·te  on  the basis 
of clear and automatic rules and  limit the need  for policy decisions,  the 
oetter it will be.  (The  main policy areas where  policy decisions  may  be 
required are the accession to or withdrawal  from the Fund;  acceptance  or 
not  of voluntary deposits;  interest rate and investment  policy,  including 
the  use  of profits, utilisation of subacri  bed or callable c,a.pi tal; 
utilisation of a~ditional voluntari~ subscribed capital.) 
2.  !.t:mar-ement  13hould be placed in the hands  of an Executi:il'e  Manager,  wi. th 
a  r-:n~all  Secretariat,  who  will be  responsible to a  Board of J.~..a.gement  of 
(sr:.,y)  20-25  members  drawn  from  a  Council  open to all partic:Lpa.ting members 
as  iif~ll  as to observers. 
Againot  this background steps should be  taken to give those 
countries most  inv,olved  in commodity trade or providing 1;he  mn.jor  financial  support 
for the Fund  a  dnciding voice in policy decisions. 
One  optiqn would be  for a  straight voting system calling for a  large 
mo.j ori  ty  '!  posoi  ble 75-8Cf/o,  to approve  a:ny  m.aj or policy proposal  c  It would 
have the merit  of oimplicity.  But  it. might  politicise decision::;  to the 
detriment;  of the real  commercial  and  financial  inter·e~Jta involved. 
An  alternative to be  studied would be  a  system  of cc;,untry  votinc; within 
throa groupe,  ru'lmely  a  consumers  group9  a  producern  &roup,  o.nd  a  finance 
group,  wi·th  coW'l.tries  being able to vote in all thre1e  groupo  in  ~ccorda.nce 
with their t:,'Tozs  import  a  or exports  of tho  commod..i.. t:i es  pa.rticipatinc; in 
the  pool  (firct  &nd  second  l;roups)  and with the  scale  of their  oblig::~.t or;r 
'r~q~:i.re--a-~impl.; majority.-of-votes,- i~~-.-over 50%  in e-och  grot.:.p  in 
" 
ordf~r to  be  adopted., 'rhe  Com.mtmi ty may  be  ac:ked  to take up  a  position on  the  early establish-· 
rnent  of a  fru.mm<~ork n.greernent.  This  would  become  operational as  and when 
enour;-h  commodity  agreements  were  able  and willing to participate  o  Readiness 
to entertain it rr;ight  have  the advantage  of fostering a.coeptance  by the 
developing countries  of the  pooling concept  o  'I'he  Commil.H:ion  proposes that if 
the advantage  seems  likely to  be  realised an indication,  at  a  sui  table  moment~ 
of ar;reement  in principle to sat  up  such an interim framE!WOrk  agreement  could 
be  useful.,  But  it would  only enter into force  once  suffident buffer-stock 
agreements are ready  "to  participate.  To  this end the  Coramur1i ty iG  read,y to  concen-
trate  on  a.  lirni  t€rd  number of commodity  agreements~ negotiate,d Hi thin a  given tir:.e. 
IXo  co:.Jr.fLTNITY  POLICIES  INVOLVED 
As  -,.,ras  agreed  "0-~l  all pa.rtic:ipants at  the  Gonferfmce  on l11ternational 
Economic  Coopera:tion 9  the  Common  Fcmd is to  [>erve  as  "a key instrument  in 
attaining th~  agr·eed  o"oje cti  ve s  of the  Integra-ted  Pro2_:Ta~7:me  for  Commocli ".; i0 r:" 0 
'l'he  estar)lishment  of the  F":.:md  thus  forms  a  central  pa1""'t  of tbe  Procr·arr,:ne  :?.C'.·:· 
has to  b::l  considered· in terms  bo-!.;h  of the  purpo::Jes  of  :;he  Programme  as  a.  v:i;olc 
and in relation to the  series  of'  commodj.ty  agreements  which  a.re  to  be  cor..cludcc~. 
'l'he  purposes of the Programme  directly affect  the  operation of  several 
Comr:n.mi ty policies"  Provl s:.ton  vrlll therefore  need to  be  made  at  an 
appropriate  moment  for the  Community  as  such to  become  a  party to the 
arrangements  e::1tablishing the  Common  Fund., 
X..  COJITCLUSIOHS 
For the  reasons  set  out  above,  and  having regard to the  :i.mpo:c'tance. of the 
issues and the  practice  followed at  the  Conference  on  Internatio::Lal  Economic 
Cooperation,  it is proposed that the  Counci 1  should  decide: 
that  the  Community position  should be  along the  lines  set  out  in 
the  present  Communication,.  both in discussions vii th Group  B/m~CD 
partners and at  the Neg·otiating  Conference; 
that  the  Community  and its Member  States  sho'llld participate in -'c he 
Nego·tiating  Conference  as  a  single  O..eH;gation,  the  spokesmen  bein0 
the  PrE\sid.ency of  ·~he  Council  and the  Commi sdon1  the  Commission 
conducting negcti at ions for matters  corning  \·rl thin  Gomrmni ty  com~ct  c··  ._~,-.• 